This is a decent article that is to my mind fundamentally wrong. It reflects the relatively recent trend in philosophy embracing the embodiment of cognition. As Melanie Challenger writes, "The intelligent actions of organisms, then, arise from the imperatives of whole bodies that must preserve their own conditions for existence." In other words, "little of intelligence can meaningfully be said to be controlled by a separable thinking part that you might identify as who you are... we are not brains in vats. We are embodied creatures fully immersed in the world." The article moves back and forth between what 'causes' our thoughts and what constitutes the basis of our identity. Neither directly addresses cognition and consciousness; we may as well say we identify as someone being chased by a rhinoceros. The core question is, could the neural signals being sent from the body or through the senses be emulated and sent to a free-standing brain, to be experienced as 'wanting a coffee', 'pain', or 'being chased'? Obviously (to my mind) they could.
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