This is at once a summary and a snapshot of a wider discussion involving neural representations. These are "individuable structures or processes in the brain that have a representational role in cognition or behavior." That is, if you have a mental representation of a 'dog', then there is a physical structure (some set of neural states, for example) that serves as a 'vehicle' for that representation. Otherwise, how could the representation play any role in cognition? But what, exactly, is that vehicle? We don't really know; we can't pin it down; this is 'vehicle indeterminacy'. My own stance here is sceptical; I don't think we can talk meaningfully about mental representations as causal or effective agents of cognitive or physical behaviour. The other alternative is what might be called 'content pragmatism' - even if we can't pin it down, the concept of mental representations is useful enough to allow us to use it productively.
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