This short article uses a philosophical classic to address what might be called 'the embodiment problem'. The classic is, of course, the question, 'how do we know we are not brains in vats'? All our sensations, all our physical experiences, could be wired up as inputs into the brain. Could we tell the difference. This article argues that we could, because it would be much too complex to simulate our experiences. "Thompson and Cosmelli conclude (18 page PDF) that to really envat a brain, you must embody it. Your vat would necessarily end up being a substitute body." Well - sure. Even the simplest version of 'brain in a vat' postulates some external mechanism standing in for the human body. That's the whole point. But the question is more subtle: is it the case that there can be one and only one possible cause for a given set of conscious experiences? If the answer is 'yes', then our options for both ourselves and for AI are fundamentally limited. But on what grounds would you argue 'yes'? This article doesn't really offer those grounds, beyond saying it's complex. But complexity doesn't prove necessity.
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