Representations - such as theories or models - play a key role in science. A 'representation' of a thing is another thing where the properties of the other thing help us learn about the first thing. But, as Mauricio Suárez notes, there's no good theory of what makes something a representation of the other. In this paper he argues against two 'naturalistic' theories of representation, similarity and isomorphism, and proposes an alternative, based on representational 'force', the nature of which is theoretical, but the significance of which is non-naturalistic, but based in the perspective of the person doing the representing. Specifically, "a non-identity based understanding of similarity, which emphasises the essential role of contextual factors and agent-driven purposes in similarity." I prefer the term 'salience' to 'force', but the intent is the same.
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