My new colleague Seb sent me this link to a PDF file. The author argues that approaching the concept of security from the point of view of formal methods is a fundamental mistake. Formal systems do not allow people to break the rules or interpret the rules, and yet, this is essential. When a DRM system says "do not copy" then you can't copy. period. It wouldn't matter if a life depended on it, you couldn't break the rule. But people do not adapt well to absolutes. This is because people, unlike formal systems, are acutely aware of context, and so know when a rule should be bent or broken (and by the same token, are able to recognize when an inherently insecure system, such as fax signatures, has been breached). We don't see that yet in DRM, and until we do, no DRM system will succeed.
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