Stephen Downes

Are we 'epistemic agents'? That is: can we decide what to believe and whether or not to believe something? A lot of people argue that we are not: "I believe what I believe, and that's it." But if there is the possibility that we can be swayed by, say, evidence or reasoning, and make the decision whether or not to change our beliefs as a consequence, then we are epistemic agents. That's the stance the author takes. But then, if we are epistemic agents, first, we can be held responsible for our beliefs, but more importantly, second, our ability to decide what and whether to belief can be undermined by false information, coercion, or other factors; these are cases of 'epistemic injustice', and we should not be held responsible for our beliefs in such circumstances. Where is the line? Mona Simion argues for 'epistemic minimalism', specifically, cases where a person is governed by epistemic norms (in other words, they can comprehend reasons and evidence), and where they can freely act on those norms. We see here a lot of overlap with the concept of 'informed consent', another way to approach the idea of epistemic agency. Why is any of this relevant? Because it is, arguably, minimally the responsibility of education to foster epistemic agency in a person; educational systems that do not do this are arguably unjust.