Author: Jeremy Skrzypek
Category: Metaphysics
Word Count: 997 words
There are several items on a desk: a pen, a notebook, a laptop, a coffee cup. Each of these items is also made up of other things. The laptop has a screen, a keyboard, and a hard drive. The notebook includes several sheets of paper, a cover, and a spiral ring. Ultimately, each of these items is made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons.
But is there an additional item on the desk, something made up of all of these other items, something we might call “deskassortment”? If not, why not? And if not, why do those other objects exist but not deskassortment?
This is the problem of material composition, which is the attempt to answer the following question: under what circumstances do some smaller objects make up or compose some further object?[1]
This essay provides an overview of the four main answers to this question: always, never, just once, and sometimes.[2]
1. Mereological Universalism
Some say that smaller objects always compose some further object. For every possible combination of objects, there is some additional object composed of just those objects. According to mereological universalism, tables, trees, and human beings exist, but so do things like “shoetowermoon,” an object composed of my left shoe, the Eiffel tower, and the moon.[3]
The main advantage of mereological universalism is that it offers clear, precise, and principled answers to questions concerning what objects there are, what parts those objects have, and where one object ends and another begins.
The main concern with mereological universalism is that it is counterintuitive. Most of us wouldn’t think to include strange objects like shoetowermoon in our inventory of the universe.
Another concern with mereological universalism is that it means that an object can never change any of its parts. This is because, on mereological universalism, each object is identified with its parts: having the particular parts that it does is what makes any object the particular object that it is. As a result, on mereological universalism, replacing the brakes on my car would mean that it is no longer the same car.
2. Mereological Nihilism
Others say that it is never the case that smaller objects compose some further object. According to mereological nihilism, there are no composite material objects. The only objects that exist are simple particles, which never make up anything larger than themselves.[4]
Like mereological universalism, mereological nihilism is clear, precise, and principled. And, unlike mereological universalism, it doesn’t force us to recognize the existence of strange objects like shoetowermoon.
The main concern with mereological nihilism is that it denies the existence of most of what we would ordinarily take to exist, including ourselves.[5] On this view, there are no tables, trees, or even human beings, only simple particles in table, tree, and human-like arrangements.
Another concern with mereological nihilism is that it is not clear whether there are simple particles.[6] We used to think that atoms could not be further divided, but we later discovered that they could. For all we know, no matter how small we go, objects can always be broken down into smaller parts, and so on forever.
If that’s true, then there are no simple particles. Which means that, on mereological nihilism, there are no material objects at all.
3. Mereological Monism
Others say that smaller objects compose some further object in only one case: when they are considered altogether. According to mereological monism, the only thing that exists is the universe, the complete set of everything.[7]
Mereological monism is the simplest and most straightforward of the views we have considered. There is just one composite material object, and it includes everything.
The main concern with mereological monism is that it too denies the existence of most of what we would ordinarily take to exist. On this view, there are no tables, trees, or human beings, only table-ish, tree-ish, and human-ish patterns sewn into the seamless fabric of reality.[8]
Another concern with mereological monism is that it is not clear whether there is some complete set of everything.[9] We used to think that our solar system was everything there is, but we later discovered that the universe is much larger. For all we know, no matter how big we go, we can always go bigger. For any set of objects in our universe, there might always be some larger set which includes items not included in the first, and so on forever.
If that’s true, then there is no complete set of everything. Which means that, on mereological monism, there are no material objects at all.
4. Mereological Conservatism
Finally, others say that smaller objects sometimes, but not always, compose some further object. According to mereological conservatism, the composite material objects that exist are all and only those that we ordinarily recognize.[10]
The main concern with mereological conservatism is that it seems arbitrary. Consider islands and incars. An island is a mass of land surrounded by water. An incar is a car surrounded by a garage. We all think that islands exist. But none of us think that incars exist. And yet they would seem to be composed in very similar ways. Our decision to recognize the existence of islands but not incars seems unjustified.[11]
Consider also clouds. Take all of the water molecules that make up a particular cloud. It seems that all of those molecules minus-one should still be enough to compose a cloud. How could a single water molecule be the difference between a cloud and a non-cloud? If that’s right, then why don’t all of the molecules minus-one also compose a cloud right now? Once again, our decision to recognize the existence of the first cloud but not the second seems unjustified.[12]
5. Conclusion
These are the leading proposals for how to solve the problem of material composition. Each has its pros and its cons. None of them is clearly the best. Doing a full inventory of the contents of the desk turns out to be more difficult than we first thought.
Notes
[1] Peter van Inwagen calls this the “Special Composition Question,” in contrast to the General Composition Question, which asks “What is Composition?” (see his Material Beings, p. 20 and p. 39). It has since become the key guiding question for this debate.
[2] I owe this way of breaking down the debate to Robert C. Koons and Timothy H. Pickavance (see their Metaphysics: The Fundamentals, Chapter 6, for a similar taxonomy of views).
[3] Michael C. Rea defends this view in his “In Defense of Mereological Universalism.”
[4] van Inwagen defends this view with respect to material artifacts in his Material Beings, pp. 124-141, but also defends the view that there are living composite material objects later in the book. By “simple particles,” I mean particles that are completely lacking in any kind of parts and so cannot be further divided or broken down into anything more simple than themselves.
[5] I am assuming here that we are material objects composed entirely of material parts. That assumption might be false. Perhaps we ourselves are simple particles, material objects completely lacking in any kind of parts, or perhaps we are entirely immaterial. See Chad Vance’s Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time, Kristin Seemuth Whaley’s Animalism and Personal Identity: Are We Animals?, Jacob Berger’s The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?, and Marc Bobro’s Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 for helpful introductions on whether we are entirely material, partly material, or entirely immaterial.
[6] Philosophers call this the problem of “gunk,” where gunk refers to matter that is infinitely divisible. For a discussion of gunk as a potential problem for mereological nihilism, see Jonathan Schaffer, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.”
[7] There are two types of monism discussed and defended in contemporary metaphysics: existence monism and priority monism.
According to existence monism, the whole universe is the only material object that there is. All of the smaller “objects” that compose our universe are really just ways of arbitrarily carving up the whole for practical or explanatory purposes, like a big cake that can be sliced in an infinite number of ways.
According to priority monism, the whole universe is the only fundamental material object that there is. All of the smaller objects that compose our universe exist and are real, but are merely derivative and not fundamental, meaning that they depend for their existence and identity on the whole rather than having their own independent existence and identity. Terence Horgan and Matjaž Potrč defend existence monism in their “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism”. Jonathan Schaffer defends priority monism in his “Monism: The Priority of the Whole”. For the sake of simplicity, my arguments here concern existence monism.
[8] Here priority monism might have the advantage over existence monism. For, on priority monism, these objects exist and are real, they are just not fundamental.
[9] Philosophers call this the problem of “junk,” where junk refers to matter that is infinitely composable. For a discussion of junk as a potential problem for mereological monism, see Schaffer, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.”
[10] There are many ways of fleshing out mereological conservatism, and each is an attempt to provide an informative analysis of composition that preserves the existence of as many of the objects of our experience as possible without letting in too many objects that we wouldn’t ordinarily recognize.
According to embodied mind sparsism, for example, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, the activities of those objects jointly support consciousness. (See Stuart Clint Dowland, “Embodied Mind Sparsism”.)
According to organicism, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, the activities of those objects jointly constitute a life. As a result, living organisms exist, but things like tables and chairs do not. (See, for example, the later chapters of van Inwagen, Material Beings.)
According to emergentism, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, their union gives rise to “emergent features,” features that arise only when the parts interact with one another in certain ways. Living organisms are candidate emergent entities, but there may be other examples as well. (Trenton Merricks defends something like this view with respect to persons, in his Objects and Persons, though with respect to everything else he leans mereological nihilist. For a helpful overview of the prospects and perils of emergentism, see Koons and Pickavance, Metaphysics, Chapter 6.4.)
According to hylomorphism, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, those objects possess or exhibit a certain form, configuration, or structure. This may include both emergent and non-emergent entities. (Kathrin Koslicki defends this view in her The Structure of Objects. See also Jeremy W. Skrzypek’s Form and Matter: Hylomorphism.)
And according to brutalism, smaller objects sometimes but not always compose something larger than themselves, but there is no further analysis possible for when this occurs. It is just a brute fact. (Ned Markosian defends this view in his “Brutal Composition.”)
[11] See John Hawthorne, Metaphysical Essays, p. vii for a brief discussion of this argument.
[12] See Peter Unger, “The Problem of the Many,” and David Lewis, “Many, but Almost One” for important discussions of this argument. For an excellent general overview of islands, incars, clouds, other problems for mereological conservatism, and how we might try to solve them, see Korman, “Ordinary Objects.”
References
Dowland, Stuart Clint (2015). “Embodied Mind Sparsism.” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, No. 7: pp. 1853-1872.
Hawthorne, John. (2006). Metaphysical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence and Matjaž Potrč. (2012). “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.” In Philip Goff (Ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan: pp. 51-76.
Koons, Robert C. and Timothy H. Pickavace. (2015). Metaphysics: The Fundamentals. Wiley-Blackwell.
Korman, Daniel Z. (2020). “Ordinary Objects.” In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Koslicki, Kathrin. (2008). The Structure of Objects. Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David. (1999). “Many, but Almost One.” In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press: pp. 164-182.
Markosian, Ned. (1998). “Brutal Composition.” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 92, No. 3: pp. 211-249.
Merricks, Trenton. (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Rea, Michael C. (1998). “In Defense of Mereological Universalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2: pp. 347-360.
Schaffer, Jonathan. (2010). “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 119, No. 1: pp. 31-76.
Unger, Peter (1980) “The Problem of the Many.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1: pp. 411–67.
van Inwagen, Peter. (1990). Material Beings. Cornell University Press.
Related Essays
Form and Matter: Hylomorphism by Jeremy W. Skrzypek
Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time by Chad Vance
Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity by Kristin Seemuth Whaley
The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds? by Jacob Berger
Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro
About the Author
Jeremy Skrzypek is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Ohio Dominican University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Saint Louis University in 2016. His main areas of research are metaphysics, medieval philosophy, and philosophy of religion, with a special focus on issues surrounding the Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism and the thought of Thomas Aquinas. sites.google.com/site/jeremywskrzypek
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