Author: Jacob Berger
Category: Philosophy of Mind and Language, Metaphysics
Word count: 998
We have minds. We see the world around us; we feel happiness or sorrow; we can think, doubt, believe, remember, wonder, and hope. We also have bodies, which include our brains.
But what are minds? And what (if anything) is the relationship of the mind to the body/brain—or to anything in nature?
These questions constitute the so-called “mind-body problem,” a core issue in the philosophy of mind, the area of philosophy that studies phenomena such as thought, perception, emotion, memory, agency, and consciousness.
This essay introduces some of the most influential answers to these questions.
1. Varieties of Dualism
One popular reply to the mind-body problem is dualism, which holds that the mental is fundamentally distinct from anything physical.[1] There are several versions of dualism.
Substance dualism holds that minds are mental substances, whereas bodies are physical substances. A substance is something that can exist on its own. Physical substances take up space and time: tables, stars, atoms, and human bodies are physical substances. Substance dualism proposes that minds are substances that think, feel, and experience, but do not take up space and could exist without bodies. The view is akin to the religious idea of immaterial and immortal souls.[2]
Property dualism instead holds that the mental and the physical are different types of properties. A property is a way an object can be; a brown dog has the property of being brown. But properties cannot exist without something to modify: brownness cannot exist on its own. Property dualism holds that creatures may have distinct mental and physical properties, although they perhaps cannot have mental features without also having physical ones.[3]
Many considerations support some form of dualism. “Conceivability arguments,” for example, claim that we can imagine examples of minds without bodies, as in cases of non-physical ghosts, or examples of bodies without minds, such as philosophical zombies: creatures that are physically just like us, but lack conscious experience. If what we can imagine is a good guide to what’s possible, then it seems some type of dualism follows. But such inferences are questionable, since arguably not everything we can imagine is possible. For instance, one might imagine proving a mathematical theorem, even if it’s actually unprovable.[4]
There are also reasons to doubt dualism. A well-known objection to at least substance dualism is the “problem of interaction.” It is easy to understand causal interactions between physical things that take up space and can contact one another: a baseball can break a window. But minds and bodies interact too. For example, stubbing your toe is something physical in your body that causes you to feel pain in your mind, and your mental pain causes you to physically wince. But it is unclear how these mind-body interactions could occur, if mental states do not take up space and so cannot be in contact with the body.[5]
Many therefore defend views that hold that the mind is related to the body insofar as both are physical.[6]
2. The Identity Theory
A notable view that holds the mind is physical is the identity theory, which answers the mind-body problem by claiming that mental states are identical to—or the same things as—states of our brains. Brain-scan technology reveals that mentality is tightly correlated with the firing of neurons. The identity theory simply identifies these, holding that a headache is nothing more than a pattern of nociceptor activity, just as water is nothing but H2O.[7]
The identity theory avoids the problem of interaction, since it’s clear how the brain can impact one’s body and vice versa. But difficulties nonetheless arise. For example, it seems our mental states are what philosophers call “multiply realizable”: different sorts of physical systems can all exhibit the same types of mental states. After all, many people believe that things that have no brains at all, such as forms of alien life or artificial intelligence, might one day not only act as though they feel pleasure or fear, but genuinely experience those things. But if so, then such states can’t be identical with patterns of neural activity.
3. Functionalism
The identity theory explains minds in terms of what they are physically made of. But if we ask, “What is a shoe?” a response in terms of physical make-up is no help since shoes are multiply realizable by leather, plastic, or wood. It is better to characterize shoes functionally: shoes are items whose function is, among other things, to protect our feet when we walk. Functionalism likewise claims that mental states should be understood in terms of their function, that is, their characteristic causes and effects.[8]
Functionalism thereby answers the mind-body problem by maintaining that mental states are whatever states—be they bodily or otherwise—that play the relevant roles in whatever type of organism. Pains are states typically caused by bodily harms, and in turn typically cause behaviors such as wincing. Functionalism is compatible with mental states’ being nonphysical, but simplicity recommends that in humans such states are realized by brain activity. And if we one day build an artificially intelligent robot that experiences genuine pain, pains would be realized by states of its central processing unit that perform the functions of pain.
Functionalism allows for multiple realizability, but it faces problems. Many think, for example, that even if we knew all the physical and functional facts about some creatures such as bats—everything about their physiology and behavior—we still would not know what it’s like to be a bat. Only bats, it seems, can know what the bat experience of echolocation is like. But if that’s the case, then functionalism, which holds that we can understand minds wholly in terms of their functions, is false.[9]
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Conclusion
Most contemporary philosophers of mind endorse some variety of dualism, identity theory, or functionalism.[10] But there are other theories of mind,[11] not to mention many versions of each of the above accounts, which have various advantages and disadvantages—too many for a short essay to explore! The mind-body problem thus remains one of the enduring puzzles of human thought.[12]
Notes
[1] For further discussion of both substance and property dualism and the arguments for and against them, see Calef (n.d.) and Robinson (2020).
[2] The most famous proponent of substance dualism in the history of philosophy is René Descartes; see Marc Bobro’s Descartes’ Meditations 1-3 and Descartes’ Meditations 4-6.
[3] For a defense of property dualism, see, e.g., Chalmers (1996).
[4] For discussion of the relationship between conceivability and possibility in general, see Bob Fischer’s Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity.
[5] This objection was arguably first raised for dualism by Descartes’ own student, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia; see Princess Elizabeth and Descartes (1643-9/2019).
[6] It’s worth noting that some have instead endorsed idealism, the view that the mind and body are related insofar as both are actually mental. On that view, everything is a construction of perceptions and ideas–and so there are no physical bodies, at least as traditionally understood. But idealism remains a minority position. For discussion of it, see Addison Ellis’s Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism.
[7] For a classic statement of identity theory, see, e.g., Smart (1959). For further discussion of the identity theory and the arguments for and against it, see Schneider (n.d.) and Smart (2007).
[8] For a classic statement of functionalism, see, e.g., Lewis (1972). For further discussion of functionalism and the arguments for and against it, see Polger (n.d) and Levin (2023).
[9] For this much-discussed argument, see Nagel (1974). For a similar argument against not only functionalism, but any view on which the mind is physical, see Tufan Kıymaz’s The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.
[10] See, for example, Bourget & Chalmers (n.d.), which indicates which theories in the philosophy of mind respondents are sympathetic with.
[11] For example, an issue faced by many theories is that it is unclear why anything physical, including suitably developed brains, would be associated with (much less be identical with) mental phenomena. If atoms don’t have minds, then it is not obvious why any collection of them would have minds either. To avoid this problem, some endorse panpsychism—the view that all physical objects, from atoms to tables, exhibit mental properties; for more, see, e.g., the essays in Goff and Moran (2022). Similarly, some endorse neutral monism—the theory that both mental and physical phenomena are properties of a more fundamental neutral substance; for more, see, e.g., the essays in Alter and Nagasawa (2015).
And other accounts take starker views of the mind. A view that was popular in the early 20th Century was behaviorism, on which there are no “inner” mental states; mental states are nothing but observable behaviors or dispositions of bodies to act. Feeling happy, for example, simply is (the disposition to perform) the act of smiling. For a classic statement of behaviorism, see Ryle (1949). And eliminative materialism maintains that there is no mind-body relationship because there simply are no minds at all: “mental states” are things we should no longer think exist like witches or phlogiston. For a statement of the view, see Churchland (1981).
[12] The mind-body problem is also highly relevant to many other areas of philosophy and ethics. For example, views on the the metaphysical issue of “personal identity”–how (and whether) we exist as the same being over time, despite the many changes that occur to us—are often informed by views on what the mind is and its relation to the body: see Chad Vance’s Personal Identity and Kristin Seemuth Whaley’s Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?. And whether a being has a mind—and what this means–is often thought to be highly relevant to many ethical issues: see Jonathan Spelman’s Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally? and Nathan Nobis’s The Ethics of Abortion.
References
Alter, T. & Nagasawa, Y. (eds.) (2015). Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism. Oxford University Press.
Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. (n.d.). Consciousness: panpsychism, dualism, eliminativism, identity theory, or functionalism? Survey2020.philpeople.org.
Calef, Scott. (n.d.). Dualism and mind. Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), 67–90.
Goff, P. & Moran, R. (2022). Is consciousness everywhere? Essays on panpsychism. Imprint Academic.
Levin, Janet. (2023). Functionalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).
Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3), 249–258.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
Polger, Thomas. (n.d.). Functionalism. Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Princess Elizabeth and Descartes, R. (1643-9/2019). Correspondence. In Ariew, R. & Watkins, E. (eds.), Modern philosophy: An anthology of primary sources. Hackett Publishing.
Robinson, Howard. (2020). Dualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Hutchinson.
Schneider, Steven. (n.d.) Identity theory. Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The mind/brain identity theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. The Philosophical Review, 68(2), 141–156.
Related Essays
Descartes’ Meditations 1-3 and Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro
Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism by Addison Ellis
The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism by Tufan Kıymaz
Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity by Bob Fischer
Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds by Thomas Metcalf
Personal Identity by Chad Vance
Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are? by Kristin Seemuth Whaley
Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally? by Jonathan Spelman
The Ethics of Abortion by Nathan Nobis
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About the Author
Jacob Berger is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Lycoming College. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy with a concentration in Cognitive Science at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York in 2013. His areas of specialization are philosophy of mind and cognitive science. jfberger.wixsite.com/home
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