Aboutness in imagination

Francesco Berto, Philosophical Studies, Jul 02, 2018
Commentary by Stephen Downes

One of the reasons I favour a non-representational semantics is that I don't think we can really make the idea of 'aboutness' work consistently. And 'aboutness' is core to the idea of representation: we define (in language, say) the way one thing represents, or is 'about', the other. What this paper addresses in one of the problem areas for aboutness: the imagination. How can out imagination be 'about' something if it's just something we're making up? The value of this paper is the set of four conditions for successful 'aboutness in imagination' it sets up (in section 2). The bulk of the paper after this is the derivation of formal semantics that meet these criteria, which will be of little value to most readers (unless you like formal notation). Image: Helena Kučerová .

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